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Abstract 
The Great Tohoku-Kanto earthquake and resulting tsunami has brought considerable attention to 
the issue of the construction of new power plants. We argue in this paper, nuclear power is not a 
sustainable solution to energy problems. First, we explore the stock of uranium-235 and the 
different schemes developed by the nuclear power industry to exploit this resource. Second, we 
show that these methods, fast breeder and MOX fuel reactors, are not feasible. Third, we show that 
the argument that nuclear energy can be used to reduce CO2 emissions is false: the emissions from 
the increased water evaporation from nuclear power generation must be accounted for. In the case 
of Japan, water from nuclear power plants is drained into the surrounding sea, raising the water 
temperature which has an adverse affect on the immediate ecosystem, as well as increasing CO2 
emissions from increased water evaporation from the sea. Next, a short exercise is used to show 
that nuclear power is not even needed to meet consumer demand in Japan. Such an exercise 
should be performed for any country considering the construction of additional nuclear power 
plants. Lastly, the paper is concluded with a discussion of the implications of our findings. 
Keywords: Uranium Reserve, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, CO2 Emissions, Electricity 
Supply, Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this commentary is to discuss several fundamental issues associated with 
nuclear power generation plants that are a critical component of any discussion on sustainability. 
Before going into the core of our discussion, it is useful to review the present situation of the 
Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. 
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The Great Tohoku-Kanto Earthquake that struck Japan on March 11, 2011 and the huge tsunami 
that followed put the Fukushima nuclear power generation plants in a dangerous situation. On April 
12, Japanese authorities notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of their decision to 
upgrade from an INES 5 (The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale) to an INES 7. As 
a result of this re-evaluation, the total amount of discharged iodine-131 is estimated at 1.3×1017 
becquerels, and caesium-137 is estimated at 6.1×1015 becquerels according to the Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency in Japan (Yomiuri Online 2011.04.12). Becquerel is the quantity of 
radioactive material in which one nucleus decays per second. The scale of INES is mainly based on 
the amount of discharged iodine-131 per second, so the scale of INES does not help us to evaluate 
the long-term effects of cumulative radioactive materials released from the Fukushima nuclear 
power plants on land and into the sea.  In fact, much of the radionuclides released into the 
environment around Fukushima have been a result of water leakages that were flushed into the 
ocean, rather than attached to carbon and other aerosols from a burning reactor moderator. Thus, 
the situation of the Fukushima nuclear power plants is entirely different from that of the Chernobyl 
accident with the same INES 7 rating that occurred almost exactly twenty-five years earlier in 1986. 
The Fukushima disaster could perhaps be much worse in the long-run since the disaster has yet to 
be stabilized.    
 
Despite the plausible serious long-term environmental and health problems associated with the 
Fukushima accident, Sergei Kirienko the Director General of the Russian state corporation 
Rosatom, well known as a strong advocate of the nuclear industry for economic development, 
strongly questioned the decision of the Japanese government to upgrade the disaster from INES 5 
to INES 7 (Asahi.Com. 2011.04.13). 
 
However, a significantly worse report was released by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 
on May 24 where they described, based on their updated data analysis, that not only did Unit 1 melt 
down on May 12, but also the nuclear fuels (the melting temperature of UO2 is about 2800°C) in 
Unit 2 and Unit 3 were melted down through the reactor vessels (Yomiuri Online 2011.05.24). 
TEPCO also acknowledged that the containment structure of these three units with 3cm width of 
steal (the melting temperature is about 1600°C) must already have several holes. Therefore, 
nuclear fuels full of radioactive substances are believed to have reached deep within the concrete 
situated under the containment structures. The most serious concern now is that it is impossible to 
construct a water circulation system that will cool down the temperature of the nuclear fuels to the 
state of a cold shutdown. The only practical temporary solution now available would be to construct 
a structure that completely contains the whole three units preventing radioactive substances from 
eventually flowing into the adjacent sea area.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the stock of uranium-235 
that is a fissile type of exhaustible primary energy source. The proven reserve of uranium-235 has 
been shown to be surprisingly limited. Under these circumstances what was the reaction of the 
nuclear power generation supporters? Their reaction was to try to establish a so-called Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle; attempting to invent and construct a fast breeder reactor (FBR) that uses MOX fuel (Mixed 
Oxide) consisting of PuO2 and UO2. Section 3 shows that, to date, this dream turned out to be a 
delusion. Section 4 presents the issue of CO2 emissions through the nuclear power generation 
process within a reactor due to an increase in sea water temperature. This negative aspect of 
nuclear power generation has not been paid due attention thus far. Calculation of CO 2 emissions 
from the sea water is made in this section. The numbers given in this section are dependent on 
many factors of course, but we believe that the possible discrepancy from the most reliable values 
is within the negligible range. Section 5 discusses the capacity utilization of various electricity 
generation plants in Japan, showing that it is possible to supply electricity, in particular the peak 
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demand of electricity, without resorting to the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan. Section 6 
concludes this short piece.  
 
 
2. Uranium Reserve as an Exhaustible Primary Energy Source 
 
Uranium is an exhaustible primary energy source like other primary energy sources such as oil and 
coal.  We know that the total estimated amount of proven reserves of any type of exhaustible 
primary energy source has been updated because of changes in technological and economic 
factors. However, the relative size of the estimated amount of several different proven reserves has 
not been changed much. So, it is instructive to examine the relative size of proven reserves of 
uranium in comparison with those of coal, crude oil, and liquid natural gas based upon data 
provided by the World Energy Council (2010). There are three types of energy carriers (electricity, 
fuel and heat) used for different tasks and goals produced from different forms of primary energy 
sources. What we have done here is, as a first approximation, to transform the proven reserves of 
each one of the primary energy sources into Joule values. Then, we “guestimate” the number of 
years that each type of primary energy source can last in comparison with the 474 exajoules (4.74 × 
1020 Joule) that was the total primary energy use in the year 2008 (Table 1).  
 
 
The guestimates of life span are calculated as follows: 
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(1) Coal: 1TCE=2.933 ×107 kJ; 
(2) Crude oil and Liquid Natural Gas: 1TOE=4.187 × 1010J; 1 barrel=159 litres;  
1k litre=0.925 × 103TOE 
(3) Uranium-235; 1g of U-235 =82 × 106kJ 
 
The uranium oxide product (U3O8) of a uranium mill is not directly usable as a fuel for a nuclear 
reactor and additional processing is required. Only 0.7% of natural uranium-235 is “fissile”, or 
capable of undergoing fission, the process by which energy is produced in a nuclear reactor. The 
remainder is uranium-238 (U-238). So the average weight of U3O8 is 841. Only 0.59% of the total 
U3O8 is U-235. The heat equivalent of 1g of U-235 is 82 × 106kJ. So the total energy from the 
proven reserves of uranium is equal to 82 × 106 × 103 × 37392.39 × 106 = 30.7 × 1020 J. 
 
From Table 1 we can recognize that how tiny of the uranium proven reserve in comparison with 
other exhaustible primary energy sources. Judging from this preliminary examination of uranium 
reserves we are not surprised to see that starting 1991, the production of uranium in terms of 
contained uranium had been less than reactor requirement of uranium up until now (WEC 2010, p. 
204, Fig. 6.3).  
  
 
3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Delusion 
 
The left part of Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the process of mining, milling, enriching 
and fabrication for thermal neutron reactor. Spent fuel usually contains 1% of plutonium. The 
current stock of separated plutonium stored for Japan amounts to more than 45 ton. This stock is 
equivalent to potential production of about 4,000 atomic bombs of the type dropped on Nagasaki in 
WWII. Plutonium is easily transformed into nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is prohibited to possess 
plutonium in a pure form for Japan under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The only law-abiding 
way for Japan to possess plutonium is to create a MOX (Mixed Oxide) form consisting of PuO2 and 
UO2. 
 
As examined in Section 2, fissile uranium-235 consists only of 0.7% of the total uranium; 99.3% of it 
is uranium-238 which is not fissile and cannot be used directly in a light water reactor as nuclear 
reactor fuel. plutonium-239 and uranium-238 are supposed to be disposed of as radioactive nuclear 
waste. However, if uranium-238 is successfully transformed into plutonium within a fast breeder 
reactor (FBR), almost 60% of uranium (both uranium-235 and uranium-238) could theoretically be 
utilized as nuclear fuels. In this way the actual stock of proven uranium reserves would be more 
than 60 times as much as the current stock of uranium-235! This imaginative idea is the basis of 
establishing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, depicted schematically on the right part of Figure 1. There are 
four phases leading to constructing a commercially operating FBR: (1). Experimental Reactor; (2). 
Prototype Reactor; (3). Demonstration Reactor; and (4). Commercial Reactor. Japan has reached 
only the second phase and is now planning to construct a commercial reactor in 2050! In our view, 
establishing a nuclear fuel cycle based on FBR is perhaps a delusion, a serious delusion that 
hampers the proper planning for energy safely in the long-term. Since many people started realizing 
that it might be impossible to establish a nuclear fuel cycle based on FBR, MOX is being used in the 
thermal-neutron reactor (not in FBR!) such as the Fukushima Unit 3, the fuel of which has been 
reportedly melted down. It should be noted, however, that no nuclear power plants in Japan are 
operating right now using MOX fuels except the Ikata nuclear power generation station located in 
Shikoku Island, only 210 km away from Tokushima. 
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Making mistakes is the only way for humans to acquire proper understanding of the nature and 
rational behind any technology. In the case of nuclear power generation, the learning process 
mechanism seems to be very difficult to establish, perhaps beyond the reach of humans. We would 
like to conclude this section with Soichro Honda’s famous quote to understand the nature and 
characteristics of nuclear power generation technology: “technology that does not take people 
seriously into account is not technology at all” (Honda 2009). 
 
 
4. CO2 Emission from the Sea: The Case of Nuclear Power Generation Plants 
 
Light water reactors are the most common type of thermal neutron reactor. For example, more than 
80% of nuclear power generation plants in the world in the year 1999 were light water reactors. 
Currently, two types of light water reactors are widely used: the pressurized water reactor (PWR) 
and the boiling water reactor (BWR). All commercially operating nuclear power plants in Japan are 
of these two types. For this reason, these plants are constructed near the sea because a lot of 
water is needed for their operation, since water is used for the neutron moderator. All three units of 
the Fukushima power generation station that have melted down are BWRs.  
 
It is well known that only one-third of the total heat generated by light water reactors is transformed 
into electricity due to their low level of thermal efficiency. Therefore, boiling water from a light water 
reactor must be discarded into the sea. Thus, the sea water temperature in the surrounding marine 
ecosystems must rise considerably. Yet scientists concerned with the issue of climate change have 
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not paid due attention to this highly plausible reason for increasing sea water temperatures. The 
IPCC (2011), for example, has never mentioned this type of mechanism for increasing sea water 
temperatures, only focusing on the absorbing capacity of the ocean. So it will be a nice exercise, as 
a first approximation, to investigate the order of magnitude of this temperature increase mechanism 
in terms of CO2 emissions. The numbers we go through are dependent on many factors of course, 
but we hope that the possible discrepancy from the most reliable values is within the negligible 
range. Readers of this short piece are encouraged to investigate further on this problem. 
 
In the year 1998 the amount of electricity generation was 331.35 billion kWh. As already mentioned, 
the average thermal efficiency of light water reactors in Japan is one-third. Therefore, the total heat 
discarded into the surrounding sea is 2 × 331.35 × 106 × 3.6MJ = 2.39 × 1012 MJ. The specific heat 
of 1g of water can be regarded as 4.2J. Thus, the amount of water that can be raised by one degree 
Celsius is 2.39 × 1012× 106 J/4.2 J = 0.569 × 1012 ton.   
 
We can also examine how the amount of CO2 to be resolved in 1 lire of water (mol/kg) varies with 
the temperature. Then a 1°C increase in the surface sea water induces a 2% of CO2 release from 
the sea. Suppose that the average sea water temperature around Japan is 20°C. According to the 
Japanese Meteorological Agency (2011), the CO2 concentration within the sea area around Japan 
is approximately 340ppm. Therefore, the total amount of CO2  that could be released from the sea is 
0.569 × 1018 × 340 × 10-6 × 0.02=3.87 million ton.  
 
According to Kyoto Protocol, Japan is supposed to reduce CO2 emissions by 6% of their 1990 level 
that is 1,144 million tons. So the required CO2 reduction is 68.6 million ton. Therefore, the total 
amount of CO2 emission due to the operation process of electricity generation from the nuclear 
power generation plants in Japan is 5.6% of the required reduction of CO2. This amount is not a 
negligible amount at all. It must be emphasized that this amount of CO2 emissions comes only from 
the operation process of electricity generation. There are many other possible CO2 emissions if we 
take other processes of nuclear power generation and radioactive waste, already suggested in 
Section 3, into consideration: (1) mining and milling; (2) enrichment and fabrication; (3) dealing with 
depleted uranium ore; (4) low-level radioactive waste management; (5) the final disposal process 
that has never been envisioned properly. In addition to the CO2 emission issue, there are of course 
other biological hazards, including human health problems that could ensue for an incredibly long 
period of time.  
 
The following statement in 1975 by Georgescu-Roegen deserves special attention with respect to 
the threat of heat pollution created by nuclear power generation at a fundamental level: “The 
additional heat into which all energy of terrestrial origin is ultimately transformed when used by man 
is apt to upset the delicate thermodynamic balance of the globe in two ways. First, the islands of 
heat created by power plants not only disturb the local fauna and flora of rivers, lakes, and even 
coastal seas, but they may also alter climatic patters. One nuclear plant alone may heat up the 
water in the Hudson River by as much as 7°F. Then again the sorry plight of where to build the next 
plant, and the next, is a formidable problem. Second, the additional global heat at the site of the 
plant and at the place where power is used may increase the temperature of the earth to the point 
at which the icecaps would melt—an event of cataclysmic consequences. Since the Entropy Law 
allows no way to cool a continuously heated planet, thermal pollution could prove to be a more 
crucial obstacle to growth than the finiteness of accessible resources” (the second italics part is 
added, Georgescu-Roegen, 1975, p. 358). This quote is very valuable for our debate on 
sustainability. Georgescu-Roegen argues that nuclear power plants could be a real threat to global 
warming. We must recall that some countries such as China and Russia are planning to launch the 
construction of even more nuclear power plants due to high oil price and – ironically – to fight global 
warming.  
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5. Reality Check: Electricity Supply and Peak Demand 
 
We believe that the readers of this commentary might suspect that Japan can never produce a 
sufficient supply of electricity if all their nuclear power plants are eliminated. Surprisingly, it is in fact 
possible to supply enough electricity to meet demand. Figure 2 shows full capacity and the 
operation ratio for each type of electricity generation method together with private electricity 
generation in the year 2005 in Japan. It is easy to recognize that without nuclear power generation 
plants Japan can safely secure the necessary electricity demand without any problems if the idle 
capacity of other types of electricity generation plants are used more intensively, in particular, 
thermal electric power generation plants. It is also possible to supply peak electricity demand in 
summer evenings without any difficulty. According to Asahi.com (2011.05.12), the Hirono Thermal 
Plants (five units of 3.8 million kW capacity) in the Fukushima Prefecture that were shut down after 
the earthquake will be operational again starting in mid-July 2011. So the peak electricity demand 
(55 million kW) can be supplied without any problem. Furthermore, according to Nikkei.com 
(2011.05.16), in the year 2011 for example, the full capacity of private electricity generation 
amounts to 60 million kW.  Out of this amount, 16.4 million kW of electricity can be supplied to the 
district of TEPCO. At this moment, the present maximum capacity of TEPCO is 56.2 million kW. So 
if electricity is properly distributed, there would be no electricity shortage. If this is the case, then 
why don't TEPCO and other Japanese electric power companies refer to the possible electricity 
supply that could come from the private electricity generation? The answer is that they are afraid of 
the possible separation between the generation and distribution of electricity, which will cause 
TEPCO and other Japanese electric power companies to lose their monopolistic power over the 
electricity market.   
 
 
 
As shown in this paper, it is possible to supply the peak electricity demand without resorting to 
nuclear power generation plants in Japan. Furthermore, to reduce the need for further capital 
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investments in power generation to fulfill the peak demand for only several hours in a summer 
evening, it is better for Japanese consumers to try to shift or average out their peak electricity 
demand. This averaging out policy can be done with the cooperation of industries. This policy is 
also very useful to reduce wasteful energy use by pumped-storage hydroelectricity generation 
plants that have more than 30% loss of electricity due to the raising and dropping of water during 
the periods of demand shortages. The cost of pumped-storage hydroelectricity is ten times as much 
as those of thermal and normal hydroelectricity generation plants. It is also wise to use more price 
oriented policies to make demand management more flexible; for example, instituting a peak 
electricity price scheme for summer evenings. A more sophisticated way of demand management 
using market mechanisms are occasionally useful.  
 
The readers might wonder why Japanese electric power companies promote even more 
construction of nuclear power plants in Japan. The reason is very simple: nuclear power is more 
profitable than any other method of electricity generation for the electric power companies, as 
guaranteed by the Electric Utilities Industry Law in Japan. Despite the change in this law in 1995 
that allowed independent power producers to enter into the electricity generation market, electric 
power companies still enjoy favorable positions. The Electric Utilities Industry Law stipulates that 
electric power companies can determine the electricity price based on the three factors: (1) the total 
cost of electricity generation, electricity distribution, and electricity sale; (2) a business return rate 
(determined by the Electric Utilities Industry Law); and (3) the total asset value possessed by the 
electric power companies. The total asset value of a nuclear power plant and its components is 
much bigger than that of any other type of electricity generation plant, given the business return rate 
that is applied to any type of electricity generation plant. Therefore, it is very profitable for any 
electric power company to construct as many nuclear power generation plants as possible. There 
also exist bureaucratic networks and political interest groups that facilitate electric power companies 
to take advantage of various articles in the Electric Utilities Industry Law that are favorable to the 
electric power companies. In fact, for example, some of the top ranking officers of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry can take Amakudari jobs for the electric power companies: 
“Amakudari” is the practice whereby bureaucrats retire into lucrative posts in industries they had 
overseen. The electric power companies are no exception for this very bad practice that is still 
adopted by some companies overseen by Japanese government bureaucrats. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have examined several key issues associated with nuclear power electricity generation that are 
fundamentally important for a discussion on sustainability. 
 
There is yet another deep theoretical and practical challenge associated with the quality and 
quantity of a primary energy source. The metabolic pattern with the technological development of 
society based on the massive use of fossil fuels can be described in terms of an acceleration of 
energy and material consumption together with the dramatic reallocation of distribution of age 
classes, human time profile of activities and land use patterns in various sectors of the modern 
economy, resulting in time and land saving in the energy and agricultural sectors (Mayumi, 1991). 
Furthermore, fossil fuels are “optimal” in terms of the amount of matter in bulk required for energy 
extraction, transformation, and transportation to support modern industrial society. The conclusion 
that fossil fuels are superior in terms of material flow requirement, is sometimes called Georgescu-
Roegen’s Fundamental Proposition (Kawamiya 1983; Mayumi 2001). Therefore, solar energy 
cannot easily support current fossil-fuel based manufacturing and consumption activities, as 
Georgescu-Roegen argues (1979, p. 1050): “It [the necessary amount of matter for a technology] is 
high for weak-intensity energy (as is the solar radiation at the ground level) because such energy 
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must be concentrated into a much higher intensity if it is to support the intensive industrial 
processes as those now supported by fossil fuels”. This is the one reason why large scale agro-
biofuel production from corn or sugarcane is not viable at all (Giampietro and Mayumi 2009). 
Concerning the feasibility of nuclear power generation, Georgescu-Roegen also argues that the 
necessary amount of matter is high for high-intensity energy such as thermonuclear energy 
because high-intensity energy must be contained and controlled within a stable boundary.  
 
After the nuclear fuels of the three units of the Fukushima nuclear power station melted down, it 
became impossible to reach the state of cold shut-down. As already suggested, the only plausible 
temporary remedy would be to contain all three units completely. It should be remembered that the 
containment strategy is nothing more than leaving nuclear fuels in the facility without putting the fuel 
into a cold shut down state. However, immediate action toward the construction of the containment 
structure is absolutely necessary at this moment, so that a lot of the radioactive waste can be 
prevented from flowing into the surrounding ocean. If Japan is not successful in achieving this 
temporary containment, serious irreversible biological effects would result, heavily damaging marine 
ecosystems and adversely affecting human health. 
 
Under these circumstances, it is very sad to see that the draft prepared by International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates that the nuclear power generation accident could have been 
prevented if a tsunami prevention measure was properly prepared (Asahi.com. Mini. 2011.05.31). 
We must remember that the IAEA was set up in 1957 as the world’s “Atoms for Peace” organization 
within the United Nations family. The Agency promotes safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear 
technologies. So one of the aims of the IAEA is to promote the nuclear power generation as much 
as possible! This draft plan by the IAEA was perfectly echoed in a new proposal made by some 
twenty Japanese politicians, including several former prime ministers, saying that nuclear power 
generation plants should be constructed underground (Sankei 2011.05.31). Despite their false 
claim, the high pressure coolant injection system within the reactor building in the Fukushima 
station was destroyed immediately after the earthquake itself. The IAEA and some Japanese 
politicians unfortunately misunderstand the nature and characteristic of nuclear power generation 
technology without grasping the deep meaning of S. Honda’s statement on the technology and its 
relation to the welfare of human beings. The IAEA and the politicians are trying to attribute the 
cause of the Fukushima accident to the tsunami, not to the huge earthquake that caused the 
tsunami and happen frequently in Japan. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology which is supposed to protect children from radioactive contamination as 
much as possible raised the minimum allowable contamination level for children up to 20mSv per 
year. This is the maximum level of contamination legally allowed for a professional radiologist. This 
is indeed a totally unacceptable decision. At this moment what the Japanese government must do is 
to construct a containment structure as soon as possible, and should not promote another 
Granfaloon project without properly understanding the issues involved. Unfortunately, during the 
construction process of these containment facilities a vast number of workers must go through 
serious radiation exposure; a similar exposure level to those workers at Chernobyl. 
 
We must emphasize three points associated with nuclear waste. First of all, there is no safe level of 
exposure to radiation: even very low doses can cause cancer (National Academies 2006). 
Secondly, it is almost impossible to safely operate large commercial plutonium plants for 
reprocessing spent fuels. For example, there is only one place, Rokkasho-Mura (Rokkasho village) 
of Aomori Prefecture, in Japan that is yet to be operated. Every year about 1,000 ton of spent fuels 
are produced in Japan and the stock of spent fuels that are yet to be processed is accumulating 
without being "processed" properly. Finally, concerning the high-level radioactive waste, final 
disposal sites, located underground, where the vitrified wastes are supposed to be buried for 
100,000 years have not been determined. Given this information and, as we have shown, the fact 
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that nuclear power is not needed to produce a sufficient supply of energy in Japan, any serious 
discussion of sustainability in Japan must be void of any argument for building additional nuclear 
power plants. Furthermore, the exercise performed in this paper for Japan should be carried out for 
other countries before they entertain any discussion of building new nuclear power plants. Only then 
can serious sustainability discussions occur.  
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